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Abstract
The Division of Ownership in New Ventures
The current study investigates a tripartite incentive contract between an in-
novator supplying an intellectual asset, a professional assigned to productive
tasks, and a consulting rm specializing in matching ideas and professional
skills. A rather simple pure tripartite partnership implements the consul-
tants expected prot maximum and maximizes the projects expected sur-
plus. The liquidity-constrained professional is compensated by receiving a
share of one half in the new venture. The consultants and the innovators
shares reect the relative value of search. However, the consultants optimal
search e¤ort to nd an appropriate production partner is ine¢ ciently low.
Keywords: new ventures, tripartite incentive contract, consulting contract,
partnerships.
JEL-Classications: M13 (Entrepreneurship), M21 (Business Economics)
1 Introduction
The current study investigates optimal incentive contracts to set up a new
innovative rm. Three parties are involved in the project: the innovator
supplying the idea for a new scientic application, a professional assigned to
productive tasks, and a consultant specializing in matching innovators and
professionals. The innovators idea and the professionals e¤ort constitute
productive complements while the consultants matching e¤ort only increases
the expected value of the project.2 The objective of this paper is to analyze
the resulting tripartite mechanism design problem under moral hazard and
adverse selection.
To x ideas, consider the following example. A biologist has identied
relevant antigenic proteins of a bacterium allowing the development of a new
diagnostic test. To produce a marketable test, the researcher would require
the cooperation of a partner with the appropriate experience in developing,
producing, and marketing pharmaceuticals. Typically, a consultant then of-
fers his services to match the scientist with an industrial partner. However,
whilst the consultant searches for an adequate professional, he can only re-
serve the exclusive right to act as a middleman between the innovator and a
candidate professional still to be introduced. The innovator retains the right
to opt out until a formal memorandum of association is signed.
In this example, one would expect numerous incentive problems. Initially
only the scientist will know the precision and the complexity of the new
test compared to already existing diagnostic methods.3 However, only the
professional possesses both some scientic expertise himself and industrial
experience. Hence, the quality of the match between the innovators idea
2Following Biais and Perotti (2003), for example, the consultant nevertheless provides
the actual entrepreneurial innovation.
3Jensen et al. (2003), Chukumba and Jensen (2006), and Elfenbein (2006) provide
more general discussions on the nature of an academic innovators private information.
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and the professionals productive skills constitutes private information of
the latter. Involving a consultant can reduce the matching uncertainty for
the innovator. Yet, it also introduces additional di¢ culties. Specically,
due to the sequential nature of the players interactions the contract must
be renegotiation-proof between the innovator and the consultant. Finally,
neither the search e¤ort of the consultant nor the productive e¤ort of the
professional are likely to be contractible.
The consultant in the description above resembles a university tech-
nology transfer center4 or, more generally, a business angel, respectively
a venture capitalist involved in early-stageproject development.5 While
our analysis is therefore closely related to the existing literature on venture-
capital backed start-ups, the problem of matching ideas and skills in teams
of innovators and professionals has so far not attracted much attention by
economists. Typically, economic analyses focus on start-ups in the rst -
nancing stage.6 It has long been recognized that venture capitalists provide
important consulting and management services.7 Thus, the optimal contract
must solve a double moral hazard problem since both the innovators and
the insideinvestors e¤orts a¤ect project success.
Specifying the type of moral hazard problem then allows to investigate
the institutional structure of venture-capital backed rms. For example,
Aghion and Bolton (1992), Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) and Hart and
Moore (1994, 1998) analyze models in which the entrepreneur can generate
non-transferable private benets, stealpart of the cash-ow, or threaten
to leave the rm (which is worth less without her due to the inalienability of
4OShea and Allen (2006). Chukumba and Jensen (2006) analyze start-ups and licens-
ing as substitute forms of technology transfer.
5Sohl (2003a,b).
6Gompers and Lerner (2001), Kaplan and Strömberg (2001), and Botazzi and Da Rin
(2002) provide extensive literature surveys.
7See e.g. Rind (1981), Tyebjee and Bruno (1984), Sahlman, (1990), Lerner (1995), and
Hellmann and Puri (2002).
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human capital). In this kind of environment, the optimal contract assigns to
the venture capitalist the right to take control in the poorstates of nature
or respectively to liquidate the rm.
Other authors examine the time structure of contracts. For example, Ad-
mati and Peiderer (1994) and Cornelli and Yosha (2003) show that stag-
ingthe nancing precludes mispricing securities, and/or window dressing.
Building upon a similar framework, Bergemann and Hege (1997) nd that in-
creasing shareholdings of the venture capitalist reects her learning about the
projects quality. Nöldecke and Schmidt (1998) and Lülfesmann (2004) show
that contingent ownership contracts set e¢ cient incentives in such sequential
investment problems - in particular, if the rst step requires to supply non-
marketable R&D-e¤ort. Thus, according to Schmidt (2003), the sequential
nature of the double moral hazard problem implies the predominant use of
convertible securities in nancing new ventures.8
While this literature exclusively analyzes bipartite incentive-problems be-
tween a credit-constrained innovator and a venture capitalist, there exists an
understanding that start-ups pose the problem of aligning incentives in a
multi-partite environment. Moreover, this environment does not reect the
hierarchical structures common to most multi-agent problems discussed in
the literature.9 For example, Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Dessi (2005)
already analyze multi-partite contracting to found a new rm. However, the
former analysis endogenizes the number of agents while assuming an exoge-
nous ownership structure. Dessi (2005) focuses very specically on the rst
nancing phase again. During this phase, the venture capitalist obtains
additional information through his involvement in the new rms operations.
Hence, his decision to convert debt into ownership provides a credible signal
concerning project quality to outside investors.
8This nding is empirically conrmed by Kaplan and Strömberg (2000). At the same
time, the study strongly supports the earlier analyses of the allocation of control rights.
9See Mookherjee (2005) for a recent survey and a taxonomy of principal-agent problems.
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Obviously, it is di¢ cult to analyze the complex interplay of the di¤erent
incentive-compatibility and collusion-proofness conditions in multi-partite
problems. Thus, analyses of tripartite relationships are rare in the otherwise
well developed contracting literature. Brown and Wolfstetter (1989) and
Tsoulouhas (1999) constitute noticeable exceptions which also demonstrate,
however, that solution concepts require a set of appropriate simplications.
In this respect, we have chosen to let the consultant act as a principal in the
tripartite relationship10 which appears to t best with numerous case stud-
ies on high-tech start-ups. According to Dessi (2005), the relative scarcity
of venture capitalistsskills and expertise seems well-establishedsuch as to
support this assumption.11
Given this assumption, the subsequent analysis addresses the set of prob-
lems involved in matching ideas and skills during a start-ups early stage.
A risk-neutral innovator possesses private information concerning the value
of her business idea. To realize the project she requires a professional. How-
ever, she has no expertise in recruitment herself and may therefore turn to
a risk-neutral consultant. Professionals perform operative tasks and are as-
sumed to be liquidity constrained.12 This assumption reects that high-tech
rms - such as pharmaceutical, computer, and software companies - prefer
to organize their new (joint) ventures as budgeted projects.13 Neither the
value of the innovators idea nor the e¤ort supplies of the consultant and
the professional are veriable. To align incentives between the three par-
ties compensations can therefore only be conditioned on the resulting (net)
revenue.
10Alternatively, one could introduce elements of cooperative game theory - such as the
Shapley-value concept - in the otherwise non-cooperative game. See Perez-Castrillo and
Wettstein (2005).
11On this issue also see Biais and Perotti (2003).
12As is well known from Nöldecke and Schmidt (1998) and Lülfesmann (2004) the pro-
fessional would otherwise o¤er an option-to-buyout contract.
13Davila and Foster (2004, 2005).
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The next crucial assumption of our model states that the consultants ini-
tial contract o¤er to the innovator must be renegotiation-proof. The assump-
tion implies that the terms of the incentive contract with the professional still
to be found must be rationally anticipated and included in this initial o¤er.
Although the model structure does not satisfy the standard requirements nec-
essary to apply the revelation principle, renegotiation-proofness then allows
to pursue a stepwise solution procedure similar to backward-induction.
As explained above, the professional, once found, can observe the innova-
tors type. Thus, solving a standard moral hazard problem, it is optimal to
allocate a xed share of one half in the new venture to the professional. There
are no additional xed payments. Since the professionals optimal contract
is therefore independent of project-type, communication possesses no value.
Nevertheless, contracting between the innovator and the consultant remains
cumbersome. The contract must still simultaneously address the adverse se-
lection problem with respect to innovator-types and the verication problem
concerning the consultants choice of search intensity.
Our model analysis shows that the consultants expected prot optimum
requires to set xed payments equal to zero and only share the remaining
half of the revenue with the innovator. Search e¤ort is enforced upon the
consultant by the credible threat that the innovator could opt out. However,
since the professional earns a rent, the intensity of search is ine¢ ciently low.
Further, the sharing rule between the consultant and the innovator reects
the relative value of the project-specic search activity. Consequently, the
innovator cannot gain by misrepresenting her type and will report truthfully
to the consultant. Concluding, the optimal tripartite contract constitutes a
pure revenue-sharing contract among all three parties. It can be implemented
through a governance structure in which ownership shares determine the
three parties revenue claims.
The paper is organized as follows. The subsequent section introduces the
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basic model, derives the value of the innovators outside option, and explains
the time-structure of the game. Section 3 derives the optimal tripartite
contract. The nal section provides a summary and draws conclusions.
2 The model
2.1 The production and information structure
Consider an environment with risk-neutral parties. An innovator has gener-
ated a business idea of type  = 0 drawn from a distribution G(). In order
to exploit this idea economically, she needs the assistance of an industry pro-
fessional. Professionals can be of di¤erent ability not equally matched with
the innovators project type. The quality of the match - i.e., the goodness of
tbetween the innovators idea and the professionals skills - is denoted by
x where x 2 [0; 1] is a random variable drawn from the distribution F (x; s).
The variable s = 0 denotes search e¤ort in recruiting a professional. We
assume that F (x; s) satises the regularity requirements Fs(x; s) < 0 and
Fss(x; s) > 0.14 The innovator can delegate the search activity to a consul-
tant. Production further requires the professional to supply e¤ort e  0.
Jointly, the innovative idea, quality of the match, and professional e¤ort
generate revenue
y = xe: (1)
where  is an independently distributed, positive random variable withE() =
1. Revenue is understood to be net of all production costs except for the cost
14Intuitively, intensied search generates a rst-order stochastic dominant distribution
where the search technology satises the Convexity of Distribution Function Condition
(CDFC). For a general reference, see Rogerson (1985).
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of compensating the professional. The professionals private costs of e¤ort
are given by the quadratic cost function e
2
2
. The innovator is taken to incur
prohibitively high costs of searching for a professional on her own while the
consultants search costs are c(s), with c0(s) > 0; c00(s) > 0, and c(0) = 0.
The contractual relationships between the parties are subject to multiple
constraints summarized in the following assumption.
Assumption 1: All the relevant distributions are common knowledge. In
addition,
1. if the innovator delegates search to a consultant, she observes the search
e¤ort;
2. upon contracting, but before supplying e¤ort, the professional observes
 and x;
3. third parties called upon to enforce the contract can only observe y and
verify whether explicit contractual terms are fullled;
4. the professional is nancially constrained requiring payments to be non-
negative.
Assumptions 1.1 - 1.3 imply that contracting between the innovator and
the consultant is subject to hidden action and hidden information preventing
rst-best. Due to 1.4, contracting with the professional is also second-best
because it must solve a moral hazard and adverse selection problem subject
to a liquidity-constraint.
A very specic feature of our model is that, due to his experience in
industrial production, the professional, once matched, actually observes the
productive potential of the project, i.e., the value of x. In contrast, drawing
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on his experience in matching ideas and professionals, the consultant can
reduce but not eliminate the uncertainty about the quality x of a particular
match. Finally and purely for tractability, we limit compensation rules to be
linear in revenue y.15
2.2 The innovators outside option
In this subsection we analyze the innovators stand-alone project which re-
sults if she does not contract with a consultant and must nd a professional
by herself. The expected prot from this alternative constitutes her outside-
option. Given that her search costs are assumed prohibitive, she draws x from
the distribution F (x; 0). In the ensuing match with a professional, we assume
she has the entire bargaining power. Accordingly, standard principal-agent
analysis can be used to derive the optimal contract.
The informational structure for the innovators stand-alone project fol-
lows directly from assumption 1.2, i.e. the agency relationship is subject
to a moral hazard and adverse selection problem. After the parties are
matched, an innovator (i.e. the principal) of type  o¤ers a contract CIP =
fa(; r); b(; r)g to the professional (i.e. the agent) where  denotes the
professionals report on x. Applying the revelation principle, the contract
between a -innovator matched with a professional of type x yields a com-
pensation a(; x) + b(; x)y for the professional.
Thus, the value of the outside option for an innovator of type  can be
15Observe that we are only limiting the compensation rules to be linear, not the contract
itself. Holmström and Milgrom (1987) provide further support for the linearity assumption
given that contracts are intended to extend further into the new rms future business.
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derived as:
v() = max
(e(;x);a(;x);b(;x))
Z
x=0
[xe(; x)  a(; x)  b(; x)xe(; x)] dF (x; 0) ,
(I)
subject to (e (; x) ; x) = argmax
(;)
a(; ) + b(; )x   
2
2
, (IC)
a(; x) + b(; x)xe(; x)  (e(; x))
2
2
= 0 , (PC)
a(; x) + b(; x)xe(; x) = 0, 8. (LL)
Notice that in (I) the term in the square bracket already constitutes the ex-
pected value taken over . The same observation holds for the following two
constraints. Equality (IC) is the typical incentive compatibility constraint for
an agency relationship with moral hazard and adverse selection and inequal-
ity (PC) is the participation condition. The limited liability requirement
(LL) must then be satised for all revenue realizations.
Proposition 1 If the innovator pursues her stand-alone project, she o¤ers
a type-independent incentive contract a(; r) = 0 and b(; r) = 1=2. Given
this optimal contract with the professional, the value of the outside option for
an innovator of type  is v() = 
2
4
E [x2js = 0].
Proof. We initially substitute the rst-order constraint with respect to
e¤ort
b(; x)x = e(; x) (2)
for (IC). After deriving the solution of this simplied optimization problem,
we verify that it satises truth-telling with respect to x as well.
Inserting from (2) into (PC) implies that the participation constraint
cannot be binding. Also according to (2), bonus payments are non-negative.
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Since a positive xed payment a(; x) only reduces the innovators expected
prot, (LL) implies a(; x) = 0. Using (2) to replace e(; x) in the innova-
tors objective function and optimizing pointwise yields b(; x) = b = 1
2
.
Thus, e(; x) = 1
2
x. By insertion, we have
v() =
Z
x=0

1
2
(x)2   1
4
(x)2

dF (x; 0) =
2
4
E

x2js = 0 . (3)
Finally, observe that truth-telling with respect to x is trivially satised since
a and b are constant.
The optimal stand-alone contract is extremely simple. The innovator
and the professional equally share the projects revenue. Since this revenue
has been dened net of all production costs other than the professionals
compensation, the optimal contract can thus be implemented by founding a
partnership of equals. As one would expect in a moral hazard and adverse se-
lection environment, the professional earns a positive rent. Moreover, within
the current environment communication possesses no value as discussed by
Demougin (1989) and Melumad and Reichelstein (1989).
2.3 The timing of the tripartite game
As discussed in the introduction, we assume that the consultant acts a
principal in the tripartite agency problem. The timing of the tripartite
game is as follows. First, the innovator observes the value of her project
. Second, the consultant makes a take-or-leave-it contract o¤er CCI =
r; s(r); (r); (r); CCP	 to the innovator where r denotes the innovators re-
port about her project-type, s(r) the consultants promised search intensity,
(r) a xed payment to the innovator, and (r) her revenue share. Clearly,
the compensation o¤er to the innovator is conditional on not opting out to
pursue her stand-alone project. Further, the o¤er includes the specication
of a standard incentive contract CCP with a professional still to be found.
10
Thus, CCP = f; (); ()g where  denotes the professionals report on x
while () and () are the corresponding xed payment and and revenue
claim of the professional.
Third, the innovator decides whether to accept the consultants o¤er CCI .
If she does not accept the contract, the innovator pursues her stand alone-
project. At stage four, the innovator makes her report r. Fifth, the con-
sultant searches with intensity  which is simultaneously observed by the
innovator. Recall that, so far, the initial contract CCI has only established
the exclusive right for the consultant to act as a middleman between the
innovator and a professional found through the consultants search activity.
Thus, sixth, the innovator now decides whether or not to accept the com-
pensation package f(r); (r)g or opt out to pursue her stand-alone project.
Seventh, a professional is drawn from the distribution F (x; s) and he ob-
serves  and x. Eighth, based on the contract CCI , the consultant makes the
take-or-leave-it o¤er CCP to the professional. At this stage, we require that
the professionals contract o¤er does not lead to a renegotiation of the initial
contract CCI between the consultant and the innovator. Said di¤erently, CCI
is taken to constitute an equilibrium contract o¤er.16 Ninth, the professional
makes the report  about her information x.17 Finally, y is realized and
payments are made according to the tripartite contract CCI .
16In contrast, suppose CCP were not part of the innovators contract CCI . At stage
eight, the consultant would then o¤er a contract to the professional that maximizes his
own expected prot based on his share of the revenue, i. e., (1  (r)). However, this
contract cannot sustain in equilibrium. Indeed, the innovator would have an incentive to
renegotiate to increase her xed payment and reduce her share . Obviously, the parties
would anticipate this renegotiation.
17The fact that the professionals report combines both the information on x and 
would also obtain for more generalized production functions of the type y = q(x; )e:
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3 The optimal tripartite contract
The existing literature does not allow to conclude that the revelation princi-
ple will generally apply in the tripartite game described above. In particular,
if the innovators report r () were not type-revealing, the consultants sub-
jective belief concerning the conditional distribution of x would di¤er from
that of the innovator at stage eight. We can therefore not use standard back-
ward induction to solve for the optimal tripartite contract. Yet, given the
assumption that the initial contract CCI is renegotiation-proof, we can still
pursue a step-wise procedure.
Observe that, for CCI to be renegotiation-proof between the innovator and
the consultant, CCP must maximize these two parties expected joint surplus
net of the professionals compensation costs. Given that beliefs may di¤er
between the innovator and the consultant, it would generally be di¢ cult to
agree on a contract which maximizes expected joint prot.
However, due to the assumption that the professional observes the real-
izations of both  and x, the contract is independent of the belief structure
in our model. Hence, let z = x and H(z) be any distribution of z over the
common support z  0. Consider the solution to the following problem:
max
[(z);(z);e(z)]
Z
z0
fzez)  (z) + (z)ze (z)g dH(z) (II)
subject to
(e (z) ; z) = argmax
(;)
() + ()z   ()
2
2
, (PIC)
(z) + (z)ze (z)  (e (z))
2
2
= 0, (PPC)
(z) + (z)ze (z) = 0, 8. (PLL)
Again, the professionals incentive compatibility and participation constraints
(PIC) and (PPC) are in terms of expectations taken over the revenue shock
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, while the liquidity constraint (PLL) must be satised for all realizations
of revenue y.
Proposition 2 Independent of the belief structure, the optimal renegotiation-
proof contract CCP o¤ered to the professional is characterized by (x) = 0
and (x) = 1=2. The professional supplies e¤ort e(x) = 1
2
x.
The proof follows exactly along the same lines as that of Proposition 1
and is therefore omitted. Hence, it is also true that communication between
the consultant and the professional possesses no information value.
Given Proposition 2, the expected compensation costs associated with
the e¤ort supply e(; x) = 1
2
x can simply be inserted into the consultants
problem to nd the optimal contract o¤er to the innovator CCI . Observe
that the revelation principle then applies for the remaining problem, since
the optimal contract with the professional CCP = ; 0; 1
2
	
is independent
of the partiesbeliefs. In particular, the innovator cannot inuence the pro-
fessionals contract (thus, the resulting e¤ort supply) through variations in
reporting.
Hence, the consultant acting as the principal solves
max
[();();s()]
EEx
(
(x)2
4
[1  2()]  ()  c (s()) j s()
)
(III)
subject to
 = argmax
r0
(r) + (r)
2
2
Ex

x2 j s(r)	 , (IIC)(
s() = argmax

[1  2()] 2
4
Exfx2 j g   ()  c() j g,
subject to () + () 
2
2
Ex fx2 j g  v(). (IPC)
(CCC)
The objective function (III), the innovators incentive-compatibility con-
straints (IIC), and the consultants credibility constraint (CCC) all contain
expected values taken over the revenue shock .
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The latter constraint (CCC) states that, after the innovator has accepted
the contract and made a report at stage four of the game, it must be optimal
for the consultant to provide the promised search e¤ort. Thus, anticipating
the e¤ort supply of a professional who must still be found, the consultant
will determine his search activity to maximize his expected prot. Notice,
however, that in maximizing his expected prot the consultant is constrained
by the innovators participation condition (IPC). If the expected income of
the innovator would fall short of v(), she would opt out and pursue her
stand-alone project.
To solve the optimization problem (III), we begin by investigating the
(CCC)-constraint. We initially assume that [1  2()]  0. Subsequently,
we verify that this requirement is indeed satised.
Introducing a slackness variable (), we can rewrite the (IPC)-condition
as
() + ()
2
2
Ex

x2 j s()	  v()  (())2 = 0 . (4)
Notice that, for every given () > 0, the expected income of the innovator
is monotonically increasing in the consultants search e¤ort. Thus, we can
substitute from (4) into the consultants objective function at stage ve when
he decides upon his search intensity and rewrite (CCC) as
max
(;())
2
4
Ex

x2 j 	  v()  (())2   c() . (CCC)
Restating the consultants credibility constraint immediately yields two con-
clusions. First,
s() = argmax

2
4
Ex

x2 j 	  c() . (5)
Hence, search e¤ort in the tripartite contract is second-best because of the
rent paid to the professional. Second, () = 0 which implies that the
innovators participation constraint must be binding.
14
Intuitively, it is optimal for the consultant to maximize his expected prot
by minimizing the expected costs of compensating the innovator. This com-
pensation cost minimum is realized if the innovators expected income just
meets her participation constraint. Within the current framework, this solu-
tion can also serve to enforce the promised search e¤ort upon the consultant.
He can credibly commit to search with intensity s() because the innovator
would opt out if the consultant would choose a lower intensity.2
Using this result, notice that, at stage 4, the innovators optimization
with respect to reporting will satisfy
v() = max
r0
(r) + (r)
2
2
Ex

x2 j s()	 (6)
since the rational consultant will anticipate the innovators reporting behav-
ior. By the envelope theorem it must therefore be true that
v0() =
2
2
Ex

x2 j 0	 = ()Ex x2 j s()	 . (7)
Given the value of v() provided in Proposition 1 above, it follows that
() =
1
2
Ex fx2 j 0g
Ex fx2 j s()g . (8)
Observe that [1  2()] > 0 for all  such that s() > 0. Hence, our initial
assumption can now be veried to be satised. Finally, to obtain the optimal
xed payment to the innovator we can substitute for () into (IPC) which
implies () = 0.
This contract induces innovators to report correctly because their pay-
2Hence, the solution to the consultants constraint optimization problem (CCC) does
not constitute an interior solution which would be characterized by the rst-order condi-
tion (1  ())  R hxe(; x)  (e(; x))2i fs(x; s ())dx = c0(s ()). Notice that this interior
solution implies that e¤ort falls short of s() for every () > 0.
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ments are actually independent of their reports. Observe that
(r) + (r)
2
2
Ex

x2 j s(r)	 = 0 + 2
4
Exfx2 j 0g
Ex fx2 j s(r)gEx

x2 j s(r)	
=
2
4
Exfx2 j 0g = v() . (9)
Thus, whatever value r an innovator chooses to report, the consultant re-
sponds by searching with intensity s(r). Yet, in this case the innovators
share of revenue is given by (r) and, with xed payments (r) equal to
zero, she again only obtains an expected equal to v(). Since the innova-
tor therefore possesses no incentive to misrepresent her type, the incentive-
compatibility constraint (IIC) is clearly satised as well.
Summing up the above analysis, yields the following:
Proposition 3 The optimal triparitite contract is characterized as
CCI = fs () ;  () ;  () ; CCPg (10)
= fs () ; 0; 1
2
Exfx2 j 0g
Ex fx2 j s()g ; C
CPg,
where the consultants search intensity s () is implicitly characterized by
c0(s()) =
2
4
Z
x2fs(x; s
 ())dx . (11)
The proposition warrants some remarks. First, the conclusion that () =
0 is important. Suppose to the contrary that () > 0 for some realization
of . Then individuals without any innovative project [ = 0] could report r,
obtain this positive xed payment, and go bankrupt afterwards. Obviously,
this solution is not viable since the consultant would attract an innity of
such zero-value projects.
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Second, the model yields a rather strong and testable prediction concern-
ing the innovators share. According to (8),
@()
@
=  1
2
Exfx2 j 0g
[Ex fx2 j s()g]2
@Ex fx2 j s()g
@s()
@s()
@
(12)
and, totally di¤erentiating (11), yields
@s()
@
=  

2
@Exfx2js()g
@s()
2
4
@2Exfx2js()g
(@s())2
  c00(s())
> 0 . (13)
Thus, the innovators share decreases with higher project value.3 Economi-
cally, this result implies that industry-wide consulting activities increase with
the proportion of high (above average) value projects. At the same time, the
average innovators share decreases.
Third, the optimal tripartite contract maximizing the consultants ex-
pected prot also exhibits a very simple structure. Renegotiation-proofness
requires that the professional recruited by the consultant receives a share
of 1
2
of the revenue. Thus, the consultant and the innovator can only dis-
tribute half of the expected revenue among them. As discussed above, they
cannot use xed payments to do so. Consequently, the optimal tripartite
contract can also be implemented by founding a partnership. Ownership
shares of

(1  ()); (); 1
2
	
for the consultant, the innovator, and the
professional in this partnership of three then optimally determine the dis-
tribution of project revenue. Clearly, given the moral hazard problem when
contracting with a professional, renegotiation-proofness further implies that
the contract CCI maximizes the projects expected surplus.
Finally, recall that the innovator retains her right to opt out until the
consultant has completed his search and turns back to her with a candi-
date professional. Hence, taking a only a slightly di¤erent perspective, this
opting-out possibility of the innovator mirrors a contingent-ownership claim
3Nevertheless, the value of this share increases since v0 () > 0.
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of the consultant when he sets out to search for a professional: only con-
tingent on the innovators acceptance of the professional introduced by the
consultant, the consultant can realize his ownership claim. Yet, the consul-
tants search e¤ort cannot be veried and, in our model, takes place before
the joint venture is formally founded. Hence, in contrast to the literature
on debt conversion as means to implement contingent ownership claims, the
consultants contingent claim is part of an implicit contract.
4 Summary and conclusions
The current analysis investigates a tripartite incentive contract between an
innovator supplying the idea for a new scientic application as a necessary
asset, a professional assigned to productive tasks, and a consulting rm spe-
cializing in recruiting qualied personnel. Contracts can only be contingent
on the ventures earnings gross of these parties compensation costs. The
optimal tripartite contract then implies pure (net) revenue-sharing. The
liquidity-constrained professional receives a claim on half of the new ventures
revenue.4 The innovator shares her remaining half with the consultant.
The sharing rule between the consultant and the innovator reects the
relative value of the project-specic search activity. Thus, innovators can be
taken to report their project value truthfully. Further, the innovator receives
her reservation income which is equal to the expected value of their stand-
alone project. This rule ensures that the promised search e¤ort is enforced
on the consultant by the innovators threat to opt out. Moreover, while
the value of an innovators partnership share increases with project value,
the share itself actually decreases. Correspondingly, the consultants share
4However, this particular sharing rule reects the quadratic cost assumption. Follow-
ing Belleamme and Bloch (2000) and Hauswald and Hege (2003) asymmetries in the
productive capacities of the necessary assets would yield asymmetric ownership strutures.
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which compensates for his consulting service increases with higher project
value.
These sharing-rules of the optimal tripartite incentive contract can be
implemented formally by founding a partnership of three. Yet, in contrast to
Biais and Perotti (2003), the respective ownership-shares taken in the new
rm do not reect any transfer of nancial resources. Notice that in our
model the professional becomes the majority owner. This view of optimal
ownership structures in innovative ventures also contrasts with Casamatta
(2003) and the related work on stage nancing. In these studies the liquid-
ity constraint of the innovator motivates the presence of a venture capitalist
whose nancial involvement then provides useful instruments to set appro-
priate incentives.
Within the current framework, the prospect to become a partner which
mirrors the innovators option to participate or, else, pursue her stand-alone
project sets appropriate incentives for the consultant as a matching-specialist.
Thus, the current analysis also adds to the existing literature on contingent-
ownership contracts. In Nöldecke and Schmidt (1998) and Lülfesmann (2004)
the sequential order of ownership-acquisition reects the sequential nature
of moral hazard problems. In contrast, the opting-out contract with pure
revenue-sharing derived above provides e¢ cient incentives to simultaneously
solve the moral hazard problem of the consultant and the adverse selection
problem with respect to innovator-types. Formally, the opting-out alternative
of the innovator is likely to be reected in a letter of intend signed with
the consultant. Only if the innovator accepts the producer introduced by
the consultant, the respective memorandum of association will then also be
signed.
In fact, the biologist-example in the introduction constitutes the styl-
ized account of a real case in which one of the authors was involved. The
consultant being a venture capital subsidiary of a large pharmaceutical rm
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introduced only one suitable producer which turned out to be a subsidiary of
the same pharmaceutical.5 Likely, the scientist took this outcome to signal
insu¢ cient search by the consultant. Thus, ending a lengthy period of ne-
gotiating up-front investments - i.e., xed payments - which were supposed
to reect asset values, the scientist actually opted out. He is now pursuing
his work on new diagnostics heading the research division of a super-national
health organization.
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